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A B S T R A C T
Despite a potentially revolutionary shift towards electric mobility in the passenger vehicle market, the academic
and policymaking communities remain wedded to a techno-economic paradigm that may not fully appreciate
deeper social and geographic elements of a transition to electric vehicles. In this paper, based primarily on
bivariate statistical analysis as well as a hierarchical regression analysis of a survey distributed to>5000 re-
spondents across Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, we analyze how perceptions and attitudes
towards electric vehicles and vehicle-to-grid technologies differ by income, political affiliation, and geography.
Although our findings confirm EV ownership and mobility patterns in general are related to income—those with
higher incomes both own more EVs and drive more generally—they also confirm that interest in EVs is not so
strongly related. Lower income groups seem to ask less from their cars, thus potentially opening up a market for
cheaper low-range alternates. Political orientation is correlated to car and EV ownership, with those on the “left”
more interested yet those on the “right” more able and willing to buy expensive cars. Moreover, we see variation
in preferences across urban and rural subcategories, and our findings strongly suggest that EVs need not be
promoted only for city or suburban areas. When controlling for variables, a multilevel regression analysis does
not change the overall thrust of these associations.
1. Introduction
Rapid and deep reductions in greenhouse gas emission are needed to
avoid dangerous climate change (Geels et al., 2017). To provide a
reasonable (66%) chance of limiting global temperature increases to
below 2 °C, global energy-related carbon emissions must peak by 2020
and fall by>70% in the next 35 years (IEA/IRENA, 2017). This implies
a tripling of the annual rate of energy efficiency improvement, retro-
fitting the entire building stock, generating 95% of electricity from low-
carbon sources by 2050 and shifting almost entirely towards battery
electric vehicles, or EVs. The International Energy Agency (IEA, 2017a)
even projects in its most recent World Energy Outlook, under the
“Sustainable Development Scenario,” that 875 million EVs will need to
be adopted by 2040. Configuring EVs as part of a vehicle-to-grid (V2G)
system, where vehicles can not only consume power but also store or
supply energy or energy services back to the grid, could accelerate these
trends. Mohaddes and Sweatman (2016) project that another 50 million
vehicles globally could offer active V2G services by 2030. Such adop-
tion of EVs could not only bring strong positive abatement of green-
house gases, but also displace air pollution, emissions of particulate
matter and other hazardous pollutants from road traffic (World Health
Organization, 2018).
However, to date low-carbon transitions have less success in pas-
senger transport (compared to other sectors such as electricity, heat,
and buildings), as the petroleum-fueled automobility regime is still
deeply entrenched or “locked in” in most Western countries (Steinhilber
et al., 2013; Geels et al., 2012; Urry, 2004; Cowan and Hulten, 1996;
Johan et al., 1994). Some innovations, such as hybrid EVs (HEV), plug-
in hybrids (PHEV), and battery EVs, hold promise. In 2016,> 2 million
PHEVs and EVs were on the road globally, and they exceeded 1% of
new vehicle sales in five countries (Sweden, Denmark, France, China,
UK) and 5% in two more (Norway and the Netherlands) (IEA, 2017b).
In 2017, Volvo announced that it will cease production of purely con-
ventional vehicles by 2019, followed by other manufacturers promising
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to promote EVs within a decade, including the Volkswagen Group,
BMW Group, and Fiat-Chrysler. Moreover, cities such as London, the
United Kingdom and Paris, France, also announced bans on conven-
tional vehicles by 2040, and Oslo, Norway, plans to go “car free” in the
inner city by the end of 2019.
Despite this potential shift towards electric mobility for passenger
cars, the academic community often remains wedded to a techno-eco-
nomic paradigm that may not fully appreciate the class, political, and
spatial elements of a transition to electric vehicles. By class, we refer to
income; by political orientation, a spectrum of affliations commonly
adopted across the Nordic region (Socialist/Green, Social Democrat,
Christian Democrat/Conservative, and Liberal); and by geography, both
country of origin as well as urban or rural location. For example, most
techno-economic assessments of innovation or decarbonisation, espe-
cially integrated assessment models (IAMs) have a limited representa-
tion of the actors involved (mostly firms and consumers interacting via
markets, which are shaped by exogenous policymakers) and overly
simplistic models of their decision-making (rational, optimizing) (Stern
et al., 2016; Hui, 2017). Secondly, IAMs often optimize on one di-
mension (cost), leading modelers to search for optimal or ‘first-best’
pathways, even if this includes technologies that are socially con-
troversial or not yet technically or economically feasible (Anderson and
Peters, 2016). The policy mechanisms literature also tends to be de-
mographically and spatially neutral, assuming that a single fix—such as
a carbon tax—will work across all markets. A case in point is a recent
study proposing a “carbon law” that will guarantee that zero-emissions
are reached. This model-based prescription focuses on policy, but not
politics, culture, business, and social factors, thus avoiding many cru-
cial real-world drivers (Rockstrom et al., 2017).
In this paper, we examine some of the deeper economic, political,
and spatial factors involved with the adoption (and non-adoption) of
one low-carbon form of mobility, electric vehicles. Based primarily on
analysis of a survey distributed to a mix of> 5000 respondents across
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden, and supplemented
with a comprehensive literature review, we analyze how perceptions
and attitudes towards EVs and vehicle-to-grid differ by income, political
affiliation, and geography. In doing so we hope to reveal the more
complex dynamics behind how potential adopters in Denmark, Finland,
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden consider and calculate various aspects of
conventional mobility, electric mobility, and V2G.
Our paper therefore aims to make multiple contributions. Unlike a
large body of studies looking at social or purely demographic factors
such as gender, occupation, and household size, our study has a unique
and explicit focus on issues of (a) income, classism, and equity, (b)
politics and political identity, and (c) geographic space and urbanism.
And, unlike studies investigating only EVs, we also include V2G, a
technology just emerging in the Nordic region, and elsewhere, of which
consumers have little to no previous knowledge.1 Furthermore, our
study has recent data, with a survey instrument distributed in early
2017, thereby reflecting perceptions of EVs as they existed recently,
rather than many years ago. Our survey sample also includes self-stated
actual users and adopters of EVs, those with direct experience of them,
an explicit shortcoming noted in most EV research. Finally, we would
emphasize the value of the comparative nature of our study (data
collected cross five countries) along with a large sample size (which we
believe improves our validity) in the Nordic region, currently the third
largest market for EVs in the world after China and the United States
(IEA, 2017b).
2. Research design: a survey, data analysis, and a targeted
literature review
This section describes our desearch design, including a survey, our
data analysis, and our literature review.
2.1. A comparative Nordic survey
To collect data on the income, political, and spatial dimensions of
electric mobility, our primary method was a structured questionnaire, a
“survey,” consisting of three parts with 44 total questions. This included
a choice experiment, reported on elsewhere by Noel et al. (2019a), as
well as other dimensions such as gender, education, and age, reported
on elsewhere by Sovacool et al. (2018). Here we exclusively report on
the findings relating to income, politics and political identity, and
geography and space.
The first part of the survey asked about the vehicle background and
the existing mobility patterns of respondents, namely how often they
drive, how far they drive daily on average, how much they are ex-
pecting to pay for a car, etc. The second part asked respondents what
they valued most, or least, when they considered future purchases and
design attributes such as acceleration, size, and safety. This part also
included questions specifically about electric vehicles such as charging
availability, range, and battery life, asking them to rate these features
according to a five point Likert (1932) type scale of extremely unim-
portant/very uninterested to extremely important/very interested. The
final part of the survey asked respondents for basic demographic in-
formation such as income, political affiliation, and environmental va-
lues. A complete copy of the survey is offered in the Supplementary
Online Material (SOM).
Distribution of the survey was online and anonymous, a research
design intended to minimize dishonesty and promote candor. For in-
stance, psychological studies of survey design have found that the more
impersonal the conditions, the more honest people will be. For eliciting
truthful answers, internet surveys are better than phone surveys, which
are better than in-person surveys, as “people will admit more if they are
alone than if others are in the room with them” (Stephens-Davidowitz,
2017). Our survey was completed by a mix of 4322 random re-
spondents, facilitated through the survey hosting firm Qualtrics, and
745 non-random respondents, facilitated through an online version
distributed by the authors' professional networks and during fieldwork
in the respective countries. This puts the total respondent number at
5067 shown in Table 1 and this already excludes surveys that were
incomplete or obviously false.
Undoubtedly, our research design has a number of limitations. First,
we ended up combining the sample of randomized respondents with a
purposeful sample to increase response rates from Iceland and in par-
ticular to include more respondents with direct experience of EVs.
Indeed, in their review of the literature, Rezvani et al. (2015: 133)
caution that a flaw many survey articles have is that they recruit
“participants who have had no direct experience of EVs on which to
base their responses” and are thus “psychologically distant from EVs,”
limiting “the validity of inferences about adoption drawn from their
responses.” Jensen et al. (2014, 2017) similarly argue that more EV
research needs to involve users, consumers, or drivers with actual ex-
perience of EVs, to better reflect attitudes and intentions gained from
direct experience. Second, we treat stated preferences as stable and
fixed, soliciting them at a single point in time, whereas in reality they
are flexible, fluid, and co-constructed over time, a limitation that could
be offset by the “long panel” approach proposed by Jensen et al. (2014,
2017) in future research. Third, our approach may be prone to selection
1 At the time we finished our survey in 2017, no real V2G services were of-
fered in these countries, at least at a commercial scale. Nuvve had a small pilot
project in Denmark (it has been extended to Bornholm, but at the time of the
survey it was only Frederickbjerg Forsyning). In Finland, the company Virta
was considering integrating the possibility of V2G into their back-end software
products, but not any applications. In Oslo, the Vulcan garage was under de-
velopment, but that was smart charging with stationary batteries, not V2G. In
late 2017 a pilot between Virta, Helen (utility in Helsinki) and Nissan was
announced, but this again wasn't at commercial scale. And, as of 2018, the
Parker-Project (2018) highlights at least 50 V2G projects across 14 countries,
but these are all still only at the pilot stage.
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bias in that only those expressing a strong interest in the topic of
electric mobility or V2G would potentially take the time to complete
the survey.
Nonetheless, as Fig. 1 indicates, our combined sample shows a fair
distribution across gender, age, political orientation, and education.
Simultaneously, the combined sample of respondents shows consider-
able variance for occupation (more private sector participants than
others), income (most respondents in middle ranges of household in-
come), kilometers travelled (most fewer than 50 km a day), and car
ownership (most own at least one car).
2.2. Bivariate and multivariate data analysis
The survey results were initially analyzed through descriptive bi-
variate statistical analysis and (when relevant) a variety of techniques
including Pearson chi-square (χ2), Spearman's rho (rs) correlation tests,
and K-Independent Kruskal-Wallis tests to highlight variance and as-
sociations between in-group distributions. Income (ordinal with 7
classes), political orientation (nominal with 6 classes), countries
(nominal with 5 classes), and level of urbanization (nominal with 3
classes) are analyzed with Chi-Square to highlight potential associations
between these variables and car ownership (no/yes), average KM's per
day (ordinal with 6 classes), EV driving experience (not sure/no/yes),
EV ownership (no/yes), EV interest of non-EV owners (ordinal Likert
type: with 1= very uniterested to 5= very interested), and expected
next car purchase price (ordinal with 6 classes). In turn, we draw on K-
Independent Kruskal-Wallis tests (the nonparametric ANOVA alter-
native) to analyze these independent variables in relation to the ques-
tions about car preferences and EV preferences (all Likert type ques-
tions ranging from 1= very unimportant to 5 very important).
For our data analysis, correlations are used to indicate strength of
association between variables through correlation coefficients, which
Cohen (1988) indicates are weak around 0.10, moderate around 0.30,
and strong around 0.50. However, Hemphill (2003), in a metastudy on
actual findings in psychology, a field known for its experimental work,
finds that about one-third of all correlations fall under 0.20, one third of
coefficients fall between 0.20 and 0.30 and only one third of studies
find coefficients over 0.30. Moreover, Amrhein et al. (2019) and
Wasserstein et al. (2019) both strongly argue that looking at “less sig-
nificant” effect sizes can still reveal critically important associations. As
the choice of a car is influenced by many different aspects, only some of
them discussed here, we expect low but still meaningful correlations.
Admittedly, numerous studies deploy a range of other statistical
approaches, such as multivariate analysis, cluster analysis, or stated
choice experiments, to go “beyond” single demographic attributes and
control for different variables. We do so only partly. On the one hand,
this is due to the quality of the data gathered and the diverging con-
ventions about how to handle nominal or ordinal data. We would argue
that in this case and for this paper nonparametric tests offer valid
methods of analysis, because of the categorical nature of the variables.
Furthermore, our aim was explicitly to use bivariate statistical tests in
an explorative and transparent manner to find clear associations and
variances between the particular variables (e.g., income, politics, and
space) and the variables on car use, EV experience, and vehicle pre-
ferences. In other words, to highlight those potential relationships that
sometimes get lost in larger models; often because the dependent
variable is based on current EV adopters, not future potential sub-
markets (Zarazua de Rubens, 2019). Laslty, rather than “back fit” the
results around only the most interesting or significant findings (a pro-
cess known as “p hacking” or “data-mining”), we instead present all
data in both quantitative and qualitative (narrative) form. This has the
advantage of not filtering data, and it can also be used by those seeking
to develop more rigorous models or levels of data analysis.
Nonetheless, in order to observe the relative importance of geo-
graphy, urbanization, income and political orientation, interaction ef-
fects do remain important. Hence, after we present the bivariate ana-
lysis, we present a short section with multivariate analysis to
understand the relative effects and interaction between these variables
and EV interest. This section of our paper utilizes a five model hier-
archical regression analysis to control for the influence of gender and
age, and then in subsequent models adds nationality, urbanization,
political orientation and finally income orientations. Our model has no
outliers (Std. Residual Min=−2.942, Std. Residual Max=1.749), no
multicollinearity (Tolerance between 0.28 and 0.95; VIF between 1.04
and 3.57), independence of errors (Durbin-Watson value of 1.95), and
shows variance and approximately normally distributed errors and re-
siduals, but a slight heteroscedasticity due to the ordinal nature of the
data. The results should thus be taken with care (confirming our initial
choice for non-parametric tests).
2.3. A targeted literature review
A final supplemental method was a comprehensive review of the
academic literature published in the past ten years on the topic of EVs and
social acceptance globally. To help frame our hypotheses, and also better
ground our results within the literature, we searched for studies (looking
at any country, region, or city) published with the words “electric mobi-
lity,” “mobility,” “electric vehicle,” “carbon,” “travel” and “transport” in
the titles, abstract, and keywords of full length articles alongside the words
“income,” “class,” “equity,” “politics,” “political affiliation,” “geography,”
“urban,” “rural,” and “culture.” Although not meant to be a systematic
review, meaning results were not formally coded, nor was formal content
analysis conducted, we collected approximately 50 studies to examine,
most of which are cited throughout the article.
3. Income and classism in electric mobility
3.1. Previous global literature
A growing stream of research has emphasized the connection be-
tween income and mobility patterns, including electric mobility. For if
it is true, as Fainstein (2010) has written, that a just city demands di-
versity, democracy, and equity, then systems of mobility provision must
also take into account disparities in income. Sager (2006) adds that
mobility cuts to the heart of different types of social justice or freedom:
some of it is positive, such as the freedom to move or be motile, known
as “freedom to;” others aspects are negative, such as the things we want
to avoid (pollution, unaffordable transport schemes), and can thus be
framed as “freedom from.” Both types of freedom can be impacted by
EVs. Wells (2012) suggests that “mobility, or the lack thereof, has long
been recognized as an important aspect of exclusion, inequality and
poverty.” Upham et al. (2015) add that “there are significant, income-
based differences for transport practice.” Sovacool et al. (2019: 205)
write that “electric mobility can erode elements of distributive justice
for being accessible only to the rich,” and contravene other elements of
justice by “reinforcing exclusion and elitism in national planning.”
Here, we summarize four distinct threads of scholarship: that car
ownership rates rise with income, that transport related greenhouse gas
emissions rise with income, that preferences for electric vehicles are
correlated with higher incomes, and that patterns of adoption (so far)
tend to favor wealthier households.
Table 1
Summary of survey distribution.
Country Respondents (random) Respondents (non-random) Total
Denmark 953 185 1138
Finland 962 143 1105
Iceland 496 214 710
Norway 959 103 1062
Sweden 952 100 1052
Total 4322 745 5067
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First, research has suggested that car ownership, and related factors
such as kilometers travelled, and expenditures on transport, increases
with income across the globe. In Brazil, increasing demand for mobility
rises substantially with increasing income (Manfred et al., 2006). In
Finland, vehicle ownership increases significantly with income along
with vehicle usage, whereas use of public transport, such as train, bus,
and metro, and walking decline (Upham et al., 2015). In the United
Kingdom, those in the highest income quintile travel nearly three times
further than those in the lowest quintile (Banister and Anable, 2009).
Moreover, transportation infrastructure and technology developments
often benefit middle and upper class denizens because they cater to
their transportation needs through the development of suburban high-
ways, for instance; and poorer residents or communities are more likely
to be displaced or have their neighborhoods disrupted due to
Fig. 1. Demographic characteristics of our Nordic EV survey sample.
(Source: Authors)
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developments (Roth, 2004; Kaufmann and Jemelin, 2003).
A second focus of research has been on the association between
transport related energy use, and greenhouse gas emissions, and in-
come. In the United Kingdom, for example, transport related carbon
dioxide emissions rise almost proportionally to income, and far more
than other aspects of consumption: a 1% increase in income relates to a
0.60% increase of transport emissions, but only 0.19% of home energy
emissions (Büchs et al., 2013). A global assessment of the energy and
transport emissions profiles of twelve major metropolitan area-
s—Beijing, Jakarta, London, Los Angeles, Manila, Mexico City, New
Delhi, New York, Sao Paulo, Seoul, Singapore, and Tokyo—noted that
“cities in our sample with the lowest per capita carbon footprints are
located in countries with low per capita incomes,” and that ten of the
cities displayed “a nearly perfect monotonic relationship between
carbon footprints and per capita national income” (Sovacool and
Brown, 2010: 4865). The relationship to income and emissions was
even significant in those cities that promoted walking, cycling, and
efficient public transportation.
A third research focus has been on stated preferences or intentions
related to electric vehicles and income. In France and Germany, EV
purchasing intentions increase with a higher level of income, with a
higher number of cars in the household and increases in daily mileage
travelled (Ensslen et al., 2015). In Ireland, McCoy and Lyons (2014: 91)
note “low income agents will be income constrained regardless of their
environmental preferences; higher income more able to express
environmental preferences.” A stated preference survey conducted in
the United Kingdom revealed that higher income groups are more likely
to consider a PEV as a second vehicle (Skippon and Garwood, 2011), a
finding confirmed by Noel et al. (2019a) in the Nordic region. In some
cultures such as Northern Europe (Noel et al., 2019b) or China, EVs are
perceived as an elite and luxury consumer technology (Tyfield et al.,
2014), although this is not always the case – another Chinese survey
noted that individuals from higher-income households preferred gaso-
line cars to electric ones (Yang et al., 2017).
A fourth strand of research reports on actual adoption patterns in
emerging electric vehicle markets. As Wells (2017: 751) writes, “only if
an individual is wealthy enough to own or run an electric vehicle, or is
afforded one by the company that employs them, can that individual
then benefit from the many financial incentives available to assist the
purchase.” Early adopters of plug-in EVs in Austria therefore tend to be
both wealthy and older than ordinary drivers (Wolf and Seebauer,
2014). In Sweden, current electric vehicle owners belong “to the rather
higher end” of earners compared to the normal population (Vassileva
and Campillo, 2017). In Canada, “pioneer” adopters of electric vehicles
tend to have “significantly higher income” than mainstream car buyers
(Axsen et al., 2016). In Norway, the first movers and early adopters
have tended to be high-income households using electric vehicles as a
second car (Nilsson and Nykvist, 2016), similar to adopters in the
United States (Neubauer et al., 2012).
Fig. 1. (continued)
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3.2. Nordic findings
The findings derived from our survey deepen those previously
mentioned in the literature. Our results, summarized in Table 2, suggest
that income is clearly relevant. Higher income levels are associated
with car ownership, the number of cars owned by higher income
households' increases, as does the percentage of longer distances tra-
velled per day. Regarding EVs, it is also the higher the income, the
Table 2
Differences in EV and car use and preferences about vehicle attributes by levels of income.
Dimension Incomea
Car useb
Car ownership It is well known that car ownership is associated to income and our positive correlation (rs= 0.251) is
unsurprising. In fact, in our sample 48.7% of those earning less than €10,000 own a car compared to
90.3% of those earning over €90,000 a year. Likewise, the mean number of cars increases from 0.82 to
1.74. This association extends to all five countries.
Km per day Km travelled extends to daily car travel, which too is associated and correlated to income (rs= 0.250)
with 27.4% of those earning over €90,000 driving > 50 km a day compared to 19.7% of those earning
between €50,000 and €70,000 and 8% of those earning less than €10,000 a year. This association
returns in the individual countries, except for Iceland (p= .013).
EV experience EV driving experience is similarly associated and correlated to income (rs= 0.196), with 15% of those
under €10,000 state they have experience driving an EV compared to 22% of those earning between
€30,000 and €50,000, 32.4% of those earning between €70,000 and €90,000 and 41.7% of those
earning more than €90.000. This association extends to the countries except for Iceland (not
significant and invalid test).
EV ownership EV ownership is associated to income level with another positive correlation (rs= 0.132) as 13.7% of
those earning over €90.000 own an EV compared to 2.3% of those earning between €10,001 and
€30,000. Interestingly, after recoding into a binary never owned an EV and have or currently owning
an EV, this association is slightly less significant in Denmark (p= .009, rs= 0.086) and in Norway
(p= .004, rs= 0.127), but returns in Finland (p < .001, rs= 0.144) and Sweden (p < .001,
rs= 0.138). It also returns in Iceland, but with an invalid test (p= .001, rs= 0.158).
EV interest The EV interest of non-EV owners is also associated and correlated (rs= 0.136) to income. Around
55% of the people in the groups earning under €10,000 and up to €30,000 answered somewhat
interested and very interested, a figure that hovers around 62.5% for those earning between €30,000
and €90,000 and then rises to 70.3% for those earning over €90,000. This association does not extend
to Iceland (invalid p= .641, rs= 0.138) and Norway (p= .062, rs= 0.138), but can be found in
Finland (p < .001, rs= 0.149) Sweden (p < .001, rs= 0.184) and Denmark (p < .001, rs= 0.142).
Interestingly, this is because Iceland is characterized by high levels of interest across all income
groups, and Norway similarly has a flatter distribution of interest.
Expected purchase price of next car The expected costs of a new car are also associated and definitely correlated to the level of income
(rs= 0.313). In the group earning over €90,000, 54.4% expects to buy a car over €30,000 compared
to a still surprising 6.8% for those earning less than €10,000 a year. This association extends to each of
the countries.
Car preferencesc
Design and engineering: speed/acceleration, size/comfort, design/style,
ease of operation
Only ease of operation shows no variance across income groups. Speed and Acceleration is significant,
with an increasing mean rank per income group and in particularly the low mean rank of the €10,000
to €30,000 income group versus the €70,000 and up groups. Size and comfort is answered similarly
different with an increasing mean rank per income group, and with an exceptional high mean rank for
those earning over €90,000 a year. Design and style sees a similar increase in mean rank, but also a
drop for the less than €10,000 income group, in line with students and younger age groups.
Costs and Impacts: Technical reliability, safety, fuel economy/financial
savings, price, environmental impact
Income shows variance on all but environmental impact, which is answered more or less equally across
income levels. The importance of technical reliability increases with income, but does so in groups with
less than €10,000 scoring lowest, €10,001 to €70,000 all scoring more or less equally in the middle,
and over €70,000 scoring highest. Safety (p= .035) shows variance but not for independent pairs, due
to high overall mean ranks that only slightly increase for €70,000 and up. Fuel economy and financial
savings sees a relative high mean rank for the lower income groups that drops after €50,000 a year.
Price equals fuel savings in that the mean rank is even higher for the low income groups and drops a
median across the board after €50,000 to a relatively low mean rank for the €90,000 group.
EV preferences: range, battery life, public charging, charging time, V2G Income groups think differently on three of the five questions on electric vehicles. The two where they
agree on are public charging and charging time. When it comes to EV range the under €10,000 income
groups scores this a median lower than the rest, with a peak importance for the €70,000 to €90,000
group. For battery life (p= .045) the mean rank is more or less equal with a slight bell curve for the
middle income groups. There are no independent pairs however. Lastly, for V2G capacity we see
relative high mean ranks for the first three income groups which lowers after €50,000, to a drop in
median for the greater than €90,000 group.
a All results are p < .001, except where indicated.
b Chi-Square test, percentages are collumn based (not row or total sample).
c Independent Sample Kruskal-Wallis test.
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Table 3
Differences in EV and car use and preferences about vehicle attributes by political orientation.
Dimension Political orientationa
Car useb
Car ownership Car ownership is associated to political inclination, with a 63.3% ownership rate on the left among those who
identify themselves as socialist and/or green and 86.5% among Christian democrats and conservatives. This
association extends to the countries with the exception of Iceland where car ownership is high across the political
orientations.
Km per day This association returns for daily car travel, with 10.4% of the socialist and green driving over 50 km a day and
42.1% driving only rarely, compared to 20.6% of conservatives driving over 50 km a day and only 17.5% driving
only rarely. Liberals follow closely with 18.8% and 22.3% respectively. While social democrats and the other
category can be found just above the socialist and green voters with 13.6%–13.8% and 27.2% - 29.7%
respectively. Within the countries this association returns, with Denmark (p= .001), and with the exception of
Iceland.
EV experience EV driving experience is similarly associated to political orientation with 28.2% of the liberals claiming to have
experience driving and EV, followed by 25% of the conservatives and around 22% of the left, social democrats
and “other” category. Within the countries EV experience and political orientation are associated for Denmark,
Finland, and Sweden (p= .003), but not as significant for Norway (p= .046) and Iceland (invalid).
EV ownership EV ownership is associated to political orientation but distributed differently with an equal uptake between
socialist/greens (6.7%) and liberals (6.6%), closely followed by Christian democrats/conservatives (6.3%), social
democrats (5%) and the “other” group (3.7%) with the lowest rate for those who preferred not to answer (2.9%).
After recoding to never owned an EV and owned or owning an EV, this association extends to Iceland (with a
30.3% peak for Christian democrats and conservatives) and Denmark (p= .002), with higher scores for socialists
and greens and social democrats, but does not extend to Finland, Norway or Sweden. This indicates that in those
countries political orientation is less connected to EV ownership.
EV interest The EV interest of non-EV owners is also associated to political orientation and is highest for socialist and greens
(72.8%), about 60% for social democrats and liberals, and lowest for Christian democrats and conservatives with
52.9% answering somewhat interested or very interested (lower than the “other” group that could not find
themselves in our categories). This association extends to each of the countries, indicating that political leaning
impacts level of interest in EVs.
Expected purchase price of next car The expected costs of a new car are associated to political orientation. Christian democrats and conservatives and
liberals are most often expecting to pay over €30,000 (29.6% and 28.3%), while those declining to answer and
the socialist / greens do so least (15.7% and 17% respectively). The other group and social democrats sit in the
middle, but more on the low side (20.3% and 19.3%). After recoding to four categories (less than €10,000,
€10,001 to €20,000, €20,001 to €30,000, and above €30,000) this association returns within Denmark
(p= .001), Finland, and Sweden (p= .002), but not to Iceland and Norway.
Car preferencesc
Design and engineering: speed/acceleration, size/comfort,
design/style, ease of operation
Only ease of operation shows no variance across political orientations. Speed and acceleration sees quite some
variance, especially between the low mean rank of the socialists and greens compared to the highest mean rank of
the liberals. The importance seems to rise with more right positions. Size and comfort sees a similar difference
between socialists and greens and liberals as does Design and style. In both cases the liberals are closely followed
by the Christian democrats and conservatives and social democrats.
Costs and impacts: technical reliability, safety, fuel
economy/financial savings, price, environmental
impact
Regarding costs and impacts, political orientation shows significant variance for all five questions. For technical
reliability the variances stem from the low mean rank of those disinclined to answer, but not from any other
differences between pairs of orientations. For safety the variance originates in the relatively low scores by
Christian democrats / conservatives and liberals compared to the socialists / greens and social democrats. Fuel
economy and financial savings is witness to a drop in median for the conservatives and liberals especially compared
to the socialists / greens, and the social democrats to a lesser extent. The distribution of price (p= .007) is mainly
driven by the low mean rank and drop in median from the conservatives versus the high score of those on the left
of the political spectrum. Lastly, the variance in importance attributed to environmental impact of a car stems from
the rather extreme (in our sample) difference between the high mean rank of the socialists / green score and the
likewise extreme low score of the conservatives (U=130,407.5, n= 1376, z=−13.219, p < .001, r= 0.356).
Those who declined to answer or categorized themselves as “other” or liberal all scored more or less equal, with
the social democrats scoring a bit higher, but nowhere near the socialists / greens.
EV preferences: range, battery life, public charging,
charging time, V2G
Political orientation shows variance for all but public charging and charging time battery life and charging time. The
mean rank of EV Range shows a difference between the high mean rank of liberals (closely followed by
conservatives) and those on the left and not willing to answer. Battery life (p= .022) shows variance, but not for
independent pairs after correction. Lastly, V2G capacity (p= .050) shows a drop in median for the group
identifying themselves as other, especially compared to the highest mean rank of the social democrats. Although
the latter is closely followed by the other political orientations.
a All results are p < .001, except where indicated.
b Chi-Square test, percentages are collumn based (not row or total sample).
c Independent Sample Kruskal-Wallis test.
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higher the percentage that has (1) experienced them, (2) is interested in
them, and (3) – as important – owns them. At the same time, higher
income groups demand more from their cars and are willing/able to pay
for that. In a way, none of these results are surprising and they confirm
the importance of price as a core barrier when buying electric vehicles,
at least for high-end models such as Tesla or the Nissan Leaf (perhaps
less so for cheaper options such as the I-MIEV, Buddy, or Th!nk). Si-
multaneously, our results show that in time lower income groups, who
are interested in EVs nonetheless, could be served with lower priced
and less demanding electric vehicles (e.g. less range, smaller batteries,
less weight, less costly).
4. Politics and political identity in electric vehicle preferences
4.1. Previous global literature
Unlike income, less research has explored the topic of politics and
electric vehicle diffusion, with most work looking only at somewhat
peripheral elements such as car use, political discourse, and environ-
mental values related to climate change.
For instance, one survey in Germany confirmed that those with
stronger ecological norms and a liberal identity, mostly women, were
more willing to reduce car use, to use public transport, and to change
their habits (Matthies et al., 2002). Northern European popula-
tions—notably Germany, Denmark, and Norway—are also seen to
promote a strong environmental ethic politically that can be reflected in
national political parties and policies (Bigerna et al., 2017). Denmark in
particular was one of the first countries to move towards a compre-
hensive use of environmental taxes and Ecological Tax Reform (Klok
et al., 2006). Comparative studies of attitudes have also found that
Danes are more politically attuned to environmental and sustainable
energy issues (Kilbourne et al., 2002; Manfred et al., 2006; Stilianos
et al., 2013) and that they regard climate change as a more serious
problem deserving of national policy attention (Mills and Schleich,
2012), leading to stronger support for low-carbon technologies
(Sovacool and Blyth, 2015) or low-carbon forms of mobility such as
hydrogen and ridesharing (Nielsen et al., 2015). Then again, Denmark
is also one of the only countries to remove earlier introduced EV ben-
efits (Noel and Sovacool, 2016).
Another theme of work has emphasized the discursive elements of
EVs, and how they may attempt to capture the social imagination of
voters, or become salient political symbols. Ryghaug and Toftaker
(2016) for example document an underlying visionary and predictable
dimension to EV politics in Norway. Such politics are visionary in that
political deliberation can capture public desires and national imagin-
aries about mobility, but they are predictable in that these tend to be
highly scripted. Imagined futures of electric mobility are thus not ne-
cessarily radical or transformative in terms of challenging automobility.
Similarly, Bergman et al. (2017) and Bergman (2017) criticize the
politics and discussions of EV scenarios and futures in the UK for being
too conservative, for framing EVs as supporting technological progress
for incumbents and having rather constrained views of consumer be-
havior in an automobility dependent society.
The only other stream of scholarship touching on politics relates to
climate change and the motivations to address it. In the United States,
political orientation is “so strong” that it moderates the influence of
other key factors predicting climate change views such as education,
scientific literacy and self-reported understanding; whether one is a
Democrat or a Republican has a more significant influence (McCright
et al., 2016). Oddly, political views in the United States are so de-
terministic in shaping climate attitudes that they have a stronger effect
than even weather events (Marquart-Pyatt et al., 2014). Work has also
confirmed that conservatives are less likely to support climate action
than liberals in Australia and the United Kingdom (Unsworth and
Fielding, 2014). Hess and Renner (2019) similarly suggest that political
orientation, as reflected in party positions and key documents, will
influence views on things like low-carbon technologies or the phasing
out of fossil fuels, although the study notes that views are often complex
and dynamic within as well as across conservative parties.
4.2. Nordic findings
Political orientation returns in our sample as a significant variable.
While the political systems in the Nordic countries look quite alike
(from the outside), the systems and political landscapes are in fact
different. To cope we decided to offer only four main categories, which
we felt were representative even though for instance socialist and
greens are clearly not an easy mix. To compensate we actively include
the “other” category in our analysis as the category where people have
grouped themselves from a mix of political orientations ranging from
hybrid parties, extreme right, and solely green.
Table 3 summarizes how current car ownership seems highest
among conservatives and Christian Democrats closely followed by those
with a liberal orientation. These groups are also able/willing to pay
more for cars and seem to have more EV experience. At the same time,
non-EV owning conservatives in our sample are least interested in
electric vehicles and actual EV ownership is more equally distributed
across political orientations. When it comes to car preferences there is
an even clearer divide between political orientations with the left
deeming design and engineering aspects lower than the right, while
they deem costs and impacts more important than the right – ex-
emplified by the large difference in the stated importance of the en-
vironmental impact of cars. When it comes to EVs, range is more im-
portant to those on the right, while all orientations more or less agree
on the importance of charging related issues.
5. Geography, space, and urbanism in electric vehicle diffusion
5.1. Previous global literature
This final category of research emphasizes the geographic and
spatial dimensions of EVs, tying into debates about the spatiality of
mobility, and how such conceptions of space touch upon the relation-
ship between human beings, the natural environment, and technology
(Kellerman, 2011, 2012). In this sense, mobility and electric mobility is
always relational, always multi-scalar, for “one kind of mobility seems
to always involve another mobility; motility is never singular but al-
ways plural” (Adey, 2006: 18).
Thus, this body of evidence advances the notion that support for
electric vehicles will differ by political regimes, geographies, and eco-
nomic conditions, thus varying across countries (Kilbourne et al.,
2002). This is not only due to variation in socioeconomic or demo-
graphic variables across space—but also variations in access to energy
(and mobility) services, geographical conditions and climate, popula-
tion density, and consumer lifestyles (Manfred et al., 2006). As Upham
et al. (2015: 217) write, “Dependence on differing transport modes and
a wider variety of differences between … locations may affect attitudes
to innovation policy options in ways that are difficult to anticipate.” At
least two factors are at play in this concern, urban versus rural di-
versity, and spatial variation for reasons of culture, regulation, or
morphology.
One stream of research emphasizes a divide between urban and
rural locations. For instance, urbanity can have a negative influence on
energy requirements and consumption footprints (Manfred et al.,
2006). Increasing commuting distances from both suburban and rural
areas can also lead to dependency on private automobiles (Choudhury
et al., 2015). Frequency of use of mass transit is also correlated with the
size of urban areas, with more populated municipalities having better
(i.e., more equitable or affordable) access to public transport (Abenoza
et al., 2017). In the United Kingdom, living in a rural place is still
significantly associated with higher emissions even after controlling for
income, and the strongest effect is for transport emissions, which are
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16% higher for rural than for urban households (Büchs et al., 2013).
Concerning electric mobility in particular, urban areas often see lower
levels of “range anxiety” since potential adopters may consider electric
vehicles well suited for urban areas (Rezvani et al., 2015). Urban areas
are also where it can be easier to deploy public charging infrastructure
(Nilsson and Nykvist, 2016).
Another stream of research emphasizes more obtuse factors at play
that can create variation in mobility patterns or preferences: density,
land morphology, policy, and culture. King et al. (2017: 1250) argue
that “mobility through physical travel is strongly determined by geo-
graphic factors and their interdependence with transport and service
infrastructure, transport policies and economic factor. Some geographic
settings foster a high dependence on car travel principally due to a mix
of low-density housing; low levels of public transport provision; loca-
tion of businesses, services and shops away from most residential areas;
and affordable motor vehicles.” For instance, incentives for electric
vehicles differ drastically in intensity and orientation among countries
(Kester et al., 2018), ranging from those supporting innovation on the
supply side to those encouraging adoption or financing on the demand
side (Wesseling, 2016). Table 4 for instance shows three distinct reg-
ulatory environments for electric vehicles across thirteen countries.
Such “geographical diversity” can create differing arrays of policy
mixes and national contexts that can shape particular diffusion patterns
for electric vehicles (and other alternatives) (Raven et al., 2017).
Other studies have noted “notable variation” in interest in electric
vehicle adoption across major cities in the United States (Carley et al.,
2013). Geography can also be a proxy for culture, or at least cultural
variation, differences in prevailing value and belief systems that can
explain purchasing behavior (Pettifor et al., 2017a). Cultural differ-
ences across Europe can account for preferences for the design features
of vehicles, including size and power (de Mooij and Hofstede, 2002).
Culture can also mediate social influences on vehicle choices, with
consumers in the United States more susceptible to appeals rooted in
status and materialism, whereas consumers in China may be more
susceptible to appeals rooted in community wellbeing and longer-term
gain (Pettifor et al., 2017b).
5.2. Nordic findings
Our results indicate that across the countries there are quite some
differences in car use and car preferences. In some cases, as Table 5
reveals, these differences reflect existing market conditions: the relative
low car prices in Sweden, the relative high-income level in Norway, the
low-income level in Finland, the clearly felt fossil fuel dependency in
Iceland, and the strong Norwegian and Icelandic EV incentives and
market uptake. Iceland offers a rather unique case, with its extremely
high car ownership, relatively low distances travelled per day, high
interest in EVs and overall higher mean ranks for most of the car at-
tributes – especially for environmental impact, fuel efficiency/financial
savings, and safety. In turn, Finland stands out with its price focus, low
EV experience and ownership rates, and relative low mean ranks on the
other questions, including or in particularly for environmental impact
of cars (a result shared with Norway, interestingly). It is also telling that
EV range is ranked relatively highest in Norway and Iceland, countries
where cities are rather isolated urbanized centers with long and diffi-
cult geography between them (and high domestic airplane use).
Also, besides their country of residence we asked our sample whe-
ther they would consider themselves living in a rural (n= 963), sub-
urban (n=2298) or urban environment (n=1801). In our sample,
illustrated in Table 6, those who claim to live in a rural area have a
relative higher car ownership rate and EV ownership rate than those
living in (sub)urban regions. They also drive longer distances – which
might explain their higher ranking of EV range. Additionally, they
prefer V2G over the other regions. This pattern does not extend to EV
interest however, which is highest in urban environments. In these
urban regions respondents also score public charging highest and show
the highest concern for environmental impacts. In turn, suburban in-
habitants score the importance of public charging relatively low, while
giving greater importance to the size and comfort of a car. It is also in
suburban regions that EVs are most popular in Norway, which contrasts
with the dominating rural rates in Denmark and Sweden. Interestingly,
EV experience seems not to be related to the region where one lives,
indicating that rural conditions are less of a hindrance to gaining
driving experience.
Table 4
Geographic policy variation for electric vehicles, 2008 to 2014.
Country Role of government (policy
approach)
Economic interest (turnover car
industry/GDP)
Diffusion aspiration (PEV target)
2020
EV diffusion (% of total) vehicle
stock
Canada Hands-off 7.4% 3.5% 0.04%
Denmark Enabling facilitator 0.5% 1.8% 0.13%
France Interventionist director 5.7% 6.0% 0.13%
Germany Enabling facilitator 8.9% 2.4% 0.06%
Italy Interventionist director 3.3% 1.8% 0.01%
Japan Enabling facilitator 10.6% 3.3% 0.17%
Netherlands Enabling facilitator 0.5% 2.3% 0.50%
Norway Enabling facilitator 2.8% 6.7% 1.46%
Portugal Interventionist director 2.5% 10.5% 0.05%
Spain Interventionist director 7.2% 10.5% 0.05%
Sweden Enabling facilitator 7.1% 12.5% 0.17%
United Kingdom Hands-off 2.7% 4.6% 0.08%
United States Hands-off 3.6% 4.9% 0.26%
Source: Adapted from Wesseling (2016). Note GDP=Gross Domestic Product. EV=Plug-in Electric Vehicle.
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6. Interaction effects and hierarchical regression model results
The final step in our study was to conduct a hierarchical regression
analysis to observe the relative interactions among geography, urba-
nization, political orientation and income towards the level of EV in-
terest among non-EV owners. The results are shown in Table 7.
Revealingly, these combined results show that political orientation,
geography, urbanization and income explain about 7.6% of the varia-
tion in EV interest. Positively inclined are Icelanders and Socialist/
Greens, negatively inclined are lower income groups, women, higher
age groups, suburbanites and Christian Democrats/conservatives. In
general, after age and gender, nationality (e.g. EV market conditions)
and political orientation (e.g. social and environmental awareness)
seem a bit stronger linked to EV interest than urbanization and, sur-
prisingly, income which showed high bivariate correlations to vehicle
and EV ownership but explains< 1% of variance in EV interest. That,
however, is a limit of EV interest as dependent variable (Zarazua de
Rubens, 2019). The bivariate analyses showed that there was a dis-
crepancy in our sample between EV interest (more urban, sustainably
inclined) and actual EV use (absolute numbers favouring suburbs, but
relatively high rates claiming to live rurally). The model thus confirms
many of the earlier bivariate interactions and adds the relative value of
each of our key focus variables.
7. Conclusion
Our results both confirm some of the findings from the previous
literature on income, politics, and geography around vehicle and EV
ownership and preferences but also introduce some challenges and
difficult questions. With this in mind, we offer three conclusions.
First, in terms of income, while our findings confirm that EV own-
ership and mobility patterns in our sample are related to income—those
with higher incomes both own more EVs and drive more general-
ly—they also confirm that interest in EVs, while significant, is not so
strongly related. This is primary mediated by shared levels of interst in
Iceland and Norway across income groups, with our Norwegian sample
interestingly showing the highest relative number of very uniterested
participants. This may be a results of the success of EVs in Norway,
making previously uninterested individuals, now very uninterested,
polirising the market more significantly vs. a country like Denmark
where adopters are< 1% market share. As important, lower income
groups in our sample seem to ask less from their cars, thus potentially
opening up a market for cheaper low range EVs in addition to more
expensive EVs with longer ranges. This affirms earlier work that has
discussed how EVs are items of “conspicuous consumption” or luxury
(Noel et al., 2019) for some, but have mass-market appeal due to their
ease of operation or affordability according to other frames of func-
tional or environmental performance (Sovacool and Axsen, 2018). They
are thus “hybrid constructions” (Anfinsen et al., 2019) that can contain
competing and contested narratives about what EVs can accomplish,
and for whom. We also confirm in our sample that those with higher
income levels, through increased average daily kilometers in the car,
also have higher transport related emissions, introducing a pesky
question for policy: does that mean the affluent should be the focus of
decarbonisation efforts in transport, or would targeting them only
further increase the gap in travel demand between classes?
Second, our sample confirms that political orientation is correlated
to car and EV ownership, with those on the liberal “left” more inter-
ested in EVs and with a relatively high EV ownership rate but overal
lower car ownership levels. This contrasts with findings that the con-
servative “right” are more able and willing to buy expensive cars, in-
cluding EVs as given by the shared percentage and high absolute
number of EVs owned by Liberals in our sample, who simultenously
show lower interest in EVs than the Socialists/Greens. This shows EVs
have been politicized, in the same manner as renewbale energy (and
others), which may be a result of the initial deployment strategy of
focusing primarily on the environmental benefits of EV. Motivations for
EV adoption may change as we move to mass adoption, with a strategy
that places more focus on the status and technological elements of EVs
(Zarazua de Rubens, 2019; Noel et al., 2019).
Table 7
Hierarchical regression analysis controlling for country location, urbanization, political orientation, and income (N=2906).
M1 (β) M2 (β) M3 (β) M4 (β) M5 (β)
Model 1: control
Gender (F=1) −0.035 −0.042⁎ −0.041⁎ −0.057⁎⁎ −0.051⁎⁎
Age −0.166⁎⁎⁎ −0.138⁎⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎⁎ −0.120⁎⁎⁎ −0.132⁎⁎⁎
Model 2: countries
Denmark −0.025 −0.028 −0.042 −0.039
Finland −0.010 −0.012 −0.020 −0.003
Iceland 0.131⁎⁎⁎ 0.133⁎⁎⁎ 0.125⁎⁎⁎ 0.128⁎⁎⁎
Sweden 0.002 −0.001 −0.001 0.016
Model 3: urbanization
Rural −0.047⁎ −0.042⁎ −0.043⁎
Suburban −0.063⁎⁎ −0.054⁎⁎ −0.056⁎⁎
Model 4: political orientation
Other −0.041⁎ −0.033
Socialist/green 0.104⁎⁎⁎ 0.115⁎⁎⁎
Social democrat −0.012 −0.003
CD/conservative −0.047⁎ −0.047⁎
Model 5: income
Under €10.000 −0.105⁎⁎⁎
€10.001–€30.000 −0.146⁎⁎⁎
€30.001–€50.000 −0.104⁎⁎
€50.001–€70.000 −0.060⁎
€70.000–€90.000 −0.039
R2 0.026 0.045 0.049 0.067 0.076
ΔR2 0.026 0.019 0.004 0.018 0.009
ΔF 39.18⁎⁎⁎ 14.28⁎⁎⁎ 5.62⁎⁎ 13.81⁎⁎⁎ 5.90⁎⁎⁎
All ‘prefer not to say’ and missing answers have been excluded listwise and reference groups for dummies are: Men, Norway, Urban, Liberals, and Income over
€90.000.
⁎ (p < .05).
⁎⁎ (p < .01).
⁎⁎⁎ (p < .000)
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Initially we attributed this to the fact that income is more de-
terminant than political identity in shaping and molding preferences.
For instance, our sample shows a positive correlation between in-
creasing income scales and more rightwing orientations (rs 0.140,
p < .000). Yet, Section 6 showed that this does not hold towards EV
interest among our sample. More inquiry is needed on this point, but, at
the very least, it shows once more that principles or motivations to
purchase and ability to buy are two different things. This offers a po-
tentially sobering criticism of studies seeking to reveal the willingness
to pay or adopt an EV, a large set of the literature in behavioral eco-
nomics and environmental psychology, since there is an implicit as-
sumption that people's self reported attitudes match their later behavior
or lifestyle.
Third, in terms of geography, our findings confirm both variation
across the five Nordic countries in terms of preferences, but also that
EVs need not be “only for Norway,” the current global market leader. In
our sample, car preferences across the countries are quite alike, with
small variations in importance, but an overall similar trend of answers
to our preference questions (with the exception of Iceland). Counter to
our finding above about income and political orientation, we also note
that EV taxation benefits are not just for the rich, as Norway and
Iceland with their strong taxation benefits also seem to have EV own-
ership distributed more equally over income groups – although the
relationship is still positively correlated, and EV interest seems less
impacted by income and taxation policies. We see variation in pre-
ferences across urban and rural subcategories as well, with urban re-
spondents valuing battery life and availability of public chargers more,
and rural respondents valuing range and charging times more.
Furthermore, in our sample our self-proclaimed rurals stated to own
relatively more EVs than in the other groups, but as a group rurals si-
multaneously showed less interest in EVs. More critically, our findings
suggest that EVs need not be promoted only for city or suburban
areas—in fact, a case can be made that EVs should actively be promoted
in rural areas first, especially with positive preferences among our
sample's rural residents consistently reported across all five countries
and data showcasing relative high rural rates of adoption in Denmark
and Sweden.
These findings demand that we rethink national and well as local
policy targeting EVs and V2G systems in the Nordic Region. The het-
erogeneity and variety across demographic groups by income, politics,
and space implies that single policy instruments such as taxes or sub-
sidies, presumed to work uniformly and fairly across all audiences, will
be less effective than those targeting distinct subgroups. Moreover, it
strongly suggests that class, political orientation, and country of origin
may mediate patterns of mobility more broadly and/or mediate per-
ceptions of other emerging innovations such as shared mobility or au-
tomated mobility. Income, political affiliation, and spatiality (geo-
graphic location) are clearly influential factors in explaining why
people may embrace, or reject, attempts at decarbonizing transport via
electric mobility.
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